

# INTERNAL BULLETIN

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## DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRE-WORLD CONGRESS DISCUSSION

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struggle and the defense of the interests of the proletariat without regard for the effect on military operations, to call upon the workers to refuse to make any sacrifice for the "war effort", to propagate the necessity for the overthrow of one's own capitalist class and for the installation of the workers' and peasants' Government.

What did Trotsky say other than this, especially during the last years of his life, from 1938 to 1940? And how did the SWP and the British Trotskyists do any differently during the war?

2. Munis regarded the "national movements", which arose in the countries of Europe occupied by the Nazis, through truly sectarian spectacles.

Incapable of discerning what was positive in what he calls the "national movements", Munis condemns them en bloc: "The opportunist tendencies," he explains, "show themselves to be very favorable to these nationalist movements while the internationalist tendencies are resolutely opposed to them.

"...The opportunist tendencies saw in the resistance movements a positive element in the struggle against fascism, while the internationalist tendencies saw in them an element of return to the imperialist war, which the peoples had begun to transform into civil war."

Very simple.

The International, while condemning the opportunist and revisionist deviation represented by the "Three Theses" of the IKD as well as the opportunism of the French leadership between 1940 and 1943, made a clear distinction between the top Stalinist and bourgeois apparatus of the Resistance organizations and the opposition of the masses to the occupation.

The International does not condemn these "movements" en bloc. It makes the "national" aspirations of the masses its own, it participates, organizes, and leads any mass movement which is in opposition to the occupation, while striving to link up the national demands with the rest of our socialist and revolutionary program.

The International favored working within all organizations which brought the masses together on a platform of "national" demands: Popular armies of partisans, Patriotic Militias, Committees of Liberation.

It understood that these groups contained a revolutionary dynamism which might, in a broad way, be utilized for the ends of the proletarian revolution.

The International condemned the negative position adopted by the Greek comrades toward the EAM and the ELAS during the occupation, and during the insurrection of December 1944. The Interna-



tional supports, critically of course, the present struggle of the Greek partisans against the new occupation just as it supports any opposition of the masses, regardless of its confused national form, in all the countries occupied by the Anglo-Saxons and Russians. National oppression is a reality of imperialism and its wars, and poses to the proletarian vanguard problems which cannot be solved by a sectarian attitude that takes a position for or against, en bloc.

3. Munis, whose respect for revolutionary Marxism is such that he finds it unnecessary to define the class nature of the USSR in order to draw conclusions concerning its defense or non-defense as well as the correct tactic to adopt toward the Stalinist parties, rejects the defense of the USSR as well as the policy of the united front with the Stalinist parties and all the consequences which this policy involves.

With Munis it is necessary to proceed on all questions with the A-B-C of Marxism. The International has explained very clearly its present position on the question of the USSR especially recently in the "Draft Theses on the 4th International and Stalinism" submitted by the International Secretariat for the approval of the next World Congress.

We shall confine ourselves to examining the tactical conclusions drawn by Munis from his estimate of the USSR and Stalinism. Munis is against the united front with Stalinism and the transitional slogan of "Workers' Government of the traditional workers' parties" on the basis of a typically sectarian and very old argument, in spite of his pretensions as an "innovator" and a regenerator of the "sterile thinking" of the International.

According to Munis it is necessary to reject the united front with the Stalinist parties, as well as the transitional slogan of the "Workers' Government of the traditional working class parties" (concretized during one period in France by the slogan of the SP-CP-CGT to power), because Stalinism is the agent of the "triumphant counter-revolution" in Russia, "a thousand times more reactionary" than the Mensheviks of 1917, because the Stalinists are opposed to all forms of proletarian democracy and because the proletariat "no longer today has any real illusions in bourgeois democracy, in social democracy, and in Stalinism."

But since when has the policy of the united front been determined by the more reactionary or less reactionary character of the party which claims to represent the working class or by that party's concept of "workers' democracy"? The united front is a tactic imposed above all by the fact that large working class masses follow leaderships other than that of the revolutionary party.

Moreover, the fact that substantial -- in reality, very substantial -- masses (in certain countries, the overwhelming majority of the proletariat) follow these leaderships, particularly the Stalinist leadership, proves that the "illusions about Stalinism" are not only "real" but very powerful, and that it is necessary to take



them into account. Also, the united front, in its Leninist conception, far from constituting a means of consolidating these illusions and making concessions to Stalinism, is, on the contrary, the most effective and the only method which actual experience in the working class movement has yet shown us for destroying these illusions and for freeing the masses from the domination of their traitorous leaderships.

How is it possible to avoid calling for the united front with the Stalinists in countries like France, Italy, China, Brazil, etc., where they exercise a preponderant influence on the working class movement and where to separate one's self from the Stalinist militants in action, in the factories and trade unions, would be tantamount to actual suicide for any revolutionary party. If theoretical considerations on this question and all past experience do not suffice, the events which have recently agitated France and Italy irrefutably demonstrated once again that it is impossible to engage in any action while ignoring the Leninist tactic of the united front.

The use of the united front tactic moreover leads of necessity to the utilization on a higher level of the transitional slogan of "Workers' Government of the traditional working class parties."

If the masses follow these parties, and if the revolutionary party remains a very small minority, the proletarian vanguard will utilize this slogan to unmask the traitorous character of the traditional leadership. This slogan is necessary because the great majority of the masses, whether Comrade Munis likes it or not, follow the reformists and the Stalinists and not the revolutionary party. As long as conditions remain such, there are two ways in which to act.

a) Either as a doctrinaire who interests himself only in the general propaganda of "pure" communism.

b) Or as political leaders of the working class who must take into consideration what the thousands upon thousands of elements among the exploited masses are thinking.

The first way is that of the sectarian for whom Lenin wrote the "Infantile Sickness" with its admirable last chapters. Comrade Munis would do well to reread these, if he is in disagreement on this question with Trotsky and really finds his attitude toward Stalinism "absolutely false" today. He would see that Lenin, far from having conceived of the "Workers' Government of the traditional working class parties" for Russia only where "there were Soviets," visualized it also for England which had the Labor Party, the Hendersons, the Snowdens, and no Soviets. In reality, the tactic conceived by Lenin within the mass movement, whatever the particular country may be, is determined solely by the relationship of forces between the revolutionary party and the parties in which the working class still places its confidence.

Anything else is only the sterile nonsense of incurable sectarians which one would expect to have disappeared once and for all



in our International after so many years of experience.

4. Munis does not show himself any more discerning of the spirit of the Transitional Program when he considers the question of nationalizations.

He is in principle against nationalizations which "have until now served only the bourgeoisie."

What a discovery!

Munis has not understood that this slogan, like most of the slogans of the Transitional Program, is inscribed within the perspective of the revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat leading to the conquest of power, in order for each one of these slogans to have an effective meaning.

Nor does Munis distinguish between the content of our nationalization slogan and that of the reformist and Stalinist slogan: that is, that we are for nationalization without compensation or indemnities and under workers' control. "Against this dated slogan" Munis opposes simply "that of the expropriation of capitalism and the destruction of its State by democratically elected committees." Let us set aside this "destruction of the State by committees" which is indeed an original and very intelligible way of popularizing the Revolution. To a transitional slogan Munis counterposes...the Revolution.

After this one can no longer be surprised that Comrade Munis has already had enough of the Transitional Program, several parts of which seem to him to no longer correspond to the "new stage." Unfortunately it happens that "this new stage" is precisely for us the stage requiring a closer application than ever before of the "transitional program" in its entirety.

Let us now turn to the organizational differences as formulated in the documents of Comrade Munis and his friends. The inaccuracies and crude misrepresentations are numerous in these documents.

We shall select a few examples. Munis complains that the International leadership, the IEC and the IS have not encouraged international discussion preparatory to the World Congress, and have, in fact, sabotaged it.

From the very day after the April Conference, which decided to constitute itself only a Pre-Conference in preparation for the World Congress, the new international leadership declared that the discussion was open throughout the whole International on the basis of the political resolution adopted by this Conference and that it should be conducted particularly on the following points: The USSR and Stalinism, the "national question" during the war, the tactic for building mass parties of the 4th International. The position of the international leadership on all these questions was precisely



stated in a series of documents, the principal ones of which are those of the April Conference of 1946 and the Theses of Comrade Germain which gave approximately our general position on the question of the USSR and Stalinism.

In the course of the discussion which ensued immediately after the April Conference between the international leadership and the comrades of the British majority on the one hand and the comrades of the former French majority on the other, the International stated and developed its position on a series of questions relating to the character of the present period, the perspectives of capitalism, the application of the Transitional Program and the tactic to follow in building our parties.

At the same time, apropos of the differences which had risen with our Greek comrades, the International once again, as it has done in the past, stated its position on the problems posed by the new "national question." All these documents have been published in the Internal Bulletins of the IS sent to all the sections.

Is it possible that Comrade Munis knows nothing about this discussion and these documents?

Moreover, the discussion on the USSR and Stalinism has been engaged in with an intensity hitherto unknown in our movement. Four printed and two mimeographed Internal Bulletins have been published on this question, and these include a considerable majority of articles of minority tendencies. The pamphlets of Comrade Munis have been distributed at the expense of the IS to all the sections of the International. Since the April Conference, in addition to the issues of the "Quatrieme Internationale," 18 Internal Bulletins printed in French, six mimeographed in French, plus a large number of single articles in French, English, German, Spanish, as well as a few mimeographed issues of the I.B. in English have been published.

Almost the entire number of articles submitted to the IS for international discussion preparatory to the World Congress have been or are being published and distributed by the IS to the leaderships of all the sections and all the organizations adhering to the 4th International.

Never in the past has such an effort been made for the preparation of a Congress, in spite of the extremely limited financial and technical means at the disposal of the leading bodies of the International.

If the contributions of all the sections and of all the militants of the International to the international discussion is not sufficient for Comrade Munis, if the comrades are more interested than they should be in the question of the USSR and less in the other questions included in the agenda for discussion and dealt with in the documents of the International, that is one thing; but the responsibility of the International is another thing. Who has



hindered Comrade Munis himself from expressing what he thinks on all these questions? For what is paradoxical in these accusations of Comrade Munis that there is insufficient discussion is the fact that he has contributed the least. Once a series of documents appear, one would expect political counter-documents. Instead of that, Comrade Munis has lowered the level of the discussion lamentably by turning his back on political questions and quibbling about a whole series of trifling organizational points.

Comrade Munis in the next place finds that the basis of representation at the World Congress established by the 3rd Plenum of the IEC is founded on Machiavellian calculations in order to capture the majority of the World Congress. His rich imagination constructs tables to "prove" that the IEC has "cut a majority to measure."

In order to arrive at this, he becomes involved in some intricate arithmetic, citing some very inexact membership totals and gratuitously assigning "majority" and "minority" delegates. All this would indeed be comic if it were not set down in a document signed by militants, among whom are to be found venerated militants of the 4th International.

Your "round" figures as well as your "percentages" of "majority" and "minority" delegates, Comrade Munis, for example, those on France, Germany, India, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Indo-China, China, not to mention others, are others, are radically wrong and the conclusions which you draw from them are castles in Spain.

This will be clearly demonstrated at the World Congress and the findings of the credentials committee will be announced to the responsible delegates. For the moment it suffices to inform the entire International of one detail, truly indicative of the "maneuverist" nature of the IEC; at the discussion on the basis of representation to the World Congress, at the 3rd Plenum of the IEC, the proposal was made to consider Comrade Natalia as the representative at the Congress of the Russian section of the 4th International. This proposal was adopted unanimously. This has not prevented Comrade Munis from seeing in the inclusion of the Russian section in the list of sections to be represented at the World Congress, an additional "maneuver" on the part of the IEC to capture the "majority." By "unmasking" this "maneuver" he now risks losing precious votes for his own "majority." For, in reality, he counterposes a majority made to fit his own ends to the "majority" which he has computed for others.

Let us just observe the "objectivity" which distinguishes his last table, arbitrary from beginning to end. In it Germany figures with two delegates, but Cuba with four. Canada with two delegates, but South Africa with four. Holland and Belgium with two delegates, but Mexico with three and Chile with four delegates each.

The same goes for the question of representation of minorities and the transfer of mandates. The concept of the democratic ele-



ment in the regime of democratic centralism in our International means in reality for Comrade Munis, doing away more or less with the rights of the majority. Thus in place of the proportional representation of minorities as conceived by the IEC, Comrade Munis demands representation for any minority having at least 20% of the members of its section.

Democracy, according to Comrade Munis, consists, for example, in the case of a section having two representatives for  $\frac{4}{5}$  of its members, in granting one additional representative for a minority grouping of  $\frac{1}{5}$  of this organization, and thus subordinating not only the real majority of this section, but also any other section which, lacking the advantage of having a minority, could be represented by only two delegates.

Comrade Munis' proposal is a premium gratuitously offered the minorities. The IEC does not exclude minorities from the Congress. All minorities "constituting approximately at least a fourth of the membership of a section will be represented." They will have deliberative votes provided the number of delegates granted to that section permits it. In all other cases they will have consultative votes.

But even on this point the IEC was not rigid. In its discussions it was made clear that in the case of serious and politically important minorities, the IEC will be very flexible in recommending to the World Congress that these minorities be represented with the right to vote.

On the question of minorities, the IEC endeavors to give proof of an unbureaucratic flexibility. It is probable that the presence of Comrade Munis at the World Congress will be an example of it, since at present his tendency is far from representing even 20% of the Spanish section.

Finally, Comrade Munis is continually forgetting that whatever the deliberations taken up to now by the IEC on the question of the organization of the Congress, they will not prevent the Congress from definitively resolving all questions as the highest body. No one is prevented from coming to the Congress and bringing his case before it. What could be more democratic than permitting it to pass judgment on any case presented to it?

Comrade Munis also rebels against the fact that the transfer of mandates to members of the International other than those of a section is not permitted. He sees in this also an additional "maneuver" to assure a solid majority. This was necessary in order to prevent the various tendencies from making a deliberate campaign to capture mandates, based not on political clarification, but on sympathies, confidence, and other factors of this kind.

In such a competition it is the leading apparatus itself, Comrade Munis, which possesses enormous advantages and is capable,



thanks to the numerous connections which it maintains with all sections of the International, to accumulate an overwhelming number of mandates.

On this point as well, we have refrained from exploiting our advantages.

It is more than reasonable to suppose that the first mentioned accusations of Comrade Munis, to the effect that the International stifled discussion and sabotaged the distribution of the documents published independently by him, reflects his own incredulity that, once his positions become known, a strong Munis tendency does not manifest itself throughout the International. Now he takes an inventory. What he seeks in reality in this crusade against the preparations for the World Congress is to avoid having to submit to its decisions and discipline, since he is aware that the overwhelming majority of our international movement rejects his political positions and characterizes them as sectarianism, without any influence in the International. By disqualifying this Congress in advance, the preparation and organization as well as the democratic nature of which surpasses immeasurably anything of the kind that has been done before in our movement, he is in reality preparing his withdrawal from the International. There is perhaps still time for Comrade Munis to recover himself.

The International Secretariat  
December 1947



THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL IN DANGER

By

Natalia-Sedova Trotsky, G. Munis, Benjamin Peret

At the Plenum held at the end of March, 1947, the IEC adopted regulations relative to the holding of the World Congress of the Fourth International, the bureaucratic character of which, inspired by old Stalinist maneuvers, represent a most alarming symptom. The IEC, indeed, has divided the world into three categories: countries of great, moderate and slight importance. What is the criterion which inspired such an outrageously arbitrary division? No one has deigned to share it with anyone in the International.

We imagine that the IEC is going to tell us that it was guided by the example of the First Congress of the late Communist International. But are we participants in the same situation as in 1919, of a real imitation of the First Congress of the CI? At the time of the First Congress the Russian Revolution had just triumphed, the Bolshevik Party numbered hundreds of thousands of members, though in the rest of the world the Communist Parties were still only little groups, for the most part comparable to ours today; so much so that the Bolsheviks were led to diminish the weight of their party in the young international in order by the free play of an apparent democracy to avoid the latter's automatically becoming a majority against the rest of the world and imposing its uncontested will upon it. It was a question of permitting the entire world to express itself even against the Russian party, that is to say, of assuring the operation of an effective as possible democracy in the International. Is this the same end that the IEC seeks today? We categorically affirm that it is not, and we are going to demonstrate that the IS and the IEC with their division of the world into three categories have in mind completely opposite ends. While the CI aimed at the weakening of the strong parties and the strengthening of the weak parties in order to assure a maximum of democracy, our IEC aims at the strengthening of the strong parties and the weakening of the weak parties in order to maintain itself in power.

The Criterion of the Big Three

Let us ask once again: What criterion was used in making this division of the world? The numerical importance of the sections? No, obviously, since Germany, where the section has just been reconstituted, figures in the first category, though it is of necessity very weak because of its recent formation, while Italy, whose section numbers nearly as many members as France, is placed in the second. We can say as much of the Russian section -- which must obviously be insignificant -- when it is compared with any other section in countries of "moderate importance." It is, then, not a numerical criterion which governed the division; moreover, we will see further on that the consideration of numbers was taken into account and not for reasons of democracy. Besides, even if it were, this criterion would be fallacious. Let us suppose that the Bolivian section numbers 200 members and that the country has 3,000,000



inhabitants; let us admit, also, that the American section in claiming 1,600 members in a country of 150,000,000 is not exaggerating and that this figure is the exact expression of the truth. It is clear that the 200 Bolivian comrades have much more importance in the political life of their backward country than the 1,600 American comrades in theirs. For the relation of forces to be apparently the same, the American section would have to have 10,000 members. Further, this relation of forces would only be superficially equal, since 200 comrades in Bolivia, a backward country, play an infinitely greater role -- they have demonstrated it -- than 10,000 members of the American section would be able to play in the U.S., an advanced country and the principal imperialist country of the entire world.

Nor is it the revolutionary importance of the countries considered on the arena of the world class struggle which has motivated this division, since it seems that neither the United States nor England will be called upon to play a decisive role in the revolutionary wave which is becoming manifest, while Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Indo-China, North Africa, Indonesia, Poland, Hungary, etc., all excluded from the first category, are obviously destined to play an important revolutionary role in the immediate future.

These reasons set aside, there remains only the criterion of the Big Three, which has doubtlessly inspired the division of the world. It is, in fact, only the importance on the world capitalist arena which has guided the IEC in its choice.

#### The Majority as a Measuring Rod

To rest content with this declaration, however, would be to consider only one side of the question, its external aspect; in addition, the adopting of such a criterion shows an unconscious submission to imperialist influence and to the Russian counter-revolution, which must be ceaselessly combated.

It is known that the questions which will be discussed at the World Congress, whether the IEC or the IS wishes it or not, concern the politics of our sections during the imperialist war and in relation to the nationalist resistance movements, the problem of the Russian counter-revolution and world Stalinism, the tactic of the Fourth International in regard to Stalinism and reformism (united front, SP-CP-CGT Government) and our pre-war transitional program. But, as if by chance, a good number of sections in "countries of great importance," some of them subjected to a bureaucratic leadership, others badly informed, or not informed at all, on the problems to be discussed, have up to now through their majorities, put themselves on record in favor of the conservative position of the IS and the IEC.

The resolution of the IEC decides in parts 5 and 6 of paragraph 3: "To give three delegates to each organization of from



one to 150 members if they belong in Category A, two delegates if they belong in Category B, one delegate if they belong in Category C.

"For 150 to 500 members, and with an approximate minimum of 300 members -- one additional delegate. For 500 to 1,000 members, and with an approximate minimum of 750 members -- another delegate, and so on successively."

Here let us insert a piece of figuring, which, for all of its being of necessity approximate, will be nonetheless edifying.

Let us study the following tables:

Table No. 1

<u>Countries of first importance</u>	<u>Maximum estimate of number of members</u>	<u>Delegates granted by IEC</u>	<u>Majority delegates (approximate estimate)</u>	<u>Minority delegates (approximate estimate)</u>
U.S.	1,600	6	5	1
Russia	several members	3	3	0
China	100	3	2	1
India	600	4	3	1
England	400	4	4	0
France	1,000	5	4	1
Germany	50	3	1	2
Totals	3,750	28	22	6

Table No. 2

<u>Countries of moderate importance</u>	<u>Maximum estimate of number of members</u>	<u>Delegates granted by IEC</u>	<u>Majority delegates (approx. estimate)</u>	<u>Minority delegates (approx.)</u>	<u>Delegates from the sections on basis of countries of first importance</u>		
					<u>Total</u>	<u>Maj.</u>	<u>Min.</u>
Spain	60	2	1	1	3	1	2
Italy	800	4	1	3	5	1	4
Holland	50	2	2	0	3	3	0
Belgium	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Austria	50	2	0	2	3	0	3
Greece	500	3	2	1	4	2	2
Canada	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Mexico	60	2	0	2	3	0	3
Brazil	50	2	1	1	3	1	2
Argentina	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Chile	300	3	2	1	4	2	2
Bolivia	200	2	0	2	3	1	2
Indo-China	300	3	2	1	4	3	1
Totals	2,500	31	17	14	44	20	24



Table No. 3

Countries of slight importance	Maximum estimate of number of members	Delegates granted by IEC	Majority delegates (approx.)	Minority delegates (approx.)	Delegates from sections on basis of countries of first importance		
					Total	Maj.	Min.
Norway	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Denmark	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Switzerland	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Bulgaria	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Ireland	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Palestine	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Egypt	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Cyprus	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Cuba	100	1	0	1	3	0	3
Peru	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Uruguay	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Australia	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
So. Africa	300	2	1	1	4	2	2
Totals	950	14	9	5	40	18	22

From these tables it immediately stands out that seven countries (of the first category) will receive 28 delegates, while 26 countries (of the second and third category) will receive 45 delegates. In other words, seven countries of "first importance" will receive from 35% to 38% of the votes at the Congress. They will then lack only nine delegates to assure themselves control of the Congress. Of course, our Table No. 1 indicates six minority delegates. Even assuming that our estimate of the minority representation from the countries of "first importance" is not exaggerated, the six minority delegates that we note will be easily compensated for by support of the sections from countries of "moderate" and of "slight importance." Further, Tables No. 2 and No. 3 clearly show this. It can be seen, therefore, that the division adopted by the IEC inevitably and bureaucratically assures it the majority in the World Congress, a majority which it will sit tight on while avoiding discussion of the major problems which are posed before our International.

It should be observed also that in the second table the 13 sections of "moderate importance" include Spain, whose revolutionary experience -- even if it did not have more members than the Russian section -- is particularly valuable for our epoch since it marks a decisive turn in the history of the Russian counter-revolution and of Stalinism, while the Russian experience, with all its enormous value, refers precisely to a period which the Spanish revolution brought to a close. Similarly found in this list, which



is as outrageously arbitrary as the first, is Italy, which offers immense revolutionary possibilities, if a clear policy is followed in regard to revolutionary anti-Stalinist organizations (Bordighists, anarchists, left-socialists) Greece, whose admirable revolutionary combativity ought to give the IEC cause for reflection, Poland and other countries occupied by Russia, which the IEC totally forgets and which offer immense possibilities for action against the Stalinist reaction on condition that the demand is not made to defend the "degenerated workers' state" which oppresses them. Finally comes Indo-China, where support to our section has been forgotten for so long and where even to demand who assassinated Ta-Thu-Thau has been forgotten in order to support, without serious criticism, the Stalinist government of Ho-Chi-Minh, greetings from whom were so warmly hailed by The Militant and La Verite.

It has been seen that the resolution of the IEC creates an important majority in favor of the present leadership which the vote of countries of "slight importance" would not be able to modify even if they were able to send all the delegates the IEC grants them and if they all voted against the present leadership. But that is still based on the most favorable hypothesis, for it is impossible for the poor Latin-American sections to send the 10 or 12 delegates given them by the IEC. Moreover, the prohibition against proxy votes in actuality denies a number of sections in countries of "moderate" or "slight" importance the possibility of making themselves heard and of voting at the Congress, which does not prevent the IEC from demanding in advance the acceptance of the decisions which will be made by the World Congress and of desiring to prohibit all discussion after the Congress. The majority thus cunningly worked out by the IS and the IEC is thereby reinforced. Better yet, with this system, not a single opposition can hope to convince the Congress. What except ideological defeat and organic strangulation can the International expect from a leadership which has taken such decisions?

In fact, according to the system which the IEC means to impose, even if the method were rectified by giving the same basis of representation to all the sections so as to agree with the countries of "first importance" it can be seen (Tables No. 2 and No. 3) that a majority is assured for the present International leadership by the fact that the western European, North American and Canadian sections will be almost the only ones able to send all the delegates accorded them. How can it actually be supposed that Mexico, Poland, Peru, Indo-China and other countries will find the necessary means to send two or three delegates? We have difficulty in believing that this represents ignorance on the part of the International leadership; on the contrary, we believe that a question of deliberate calculation is involved, for it could not have imagined that the International would accept such an arbitrary division without protest. But the tendencies which seized the leadership thanks to the conditions immediately following the war calculated that the sections in countries of "moderate" or "slight" importance would demand in principle to be placed on an equal footing with



countries classed as those of "first importance." In most cases they would not be able to send the delegates granted them even if the IEC did justice to their objections -- and justice probably would have been rendered in order to preserve the democratic facade.

The preceding tables show that only five sections have a membership equal to or greater than 500 persons, while seven range between 100 and 400 members, and 21 have only 50 members or less. If it is really desired to follow the First Congress of the CI, which diminished the weight of the strong sections and increased the weight of the weak ones, a sole method of representation would be genuinely democratic: one delegate for 1 to 25 members and another delegate for 25 additional members or fraction of 25, up to a maximum of four delegates. To this method of representation must be added still another major democratic regulation: the transfer of majority and minority votes from one section or another or to individuals having a common position so that minorities can participate in the World Congress. To forestall the creation of artificial minorities which might threaten to swamp the Congress, it is important, therefore, to demand that minorities represent at least 20% of the members of their section in order to vote.

It can be seen by the following comparative table that the method of representation which we propose assures a very much greater guarantee of democracy at the projected Congress. We have not included in it, however, the figures on minority representation:



<u>Sections</u>	<u>Total number of members</u>	<u>Delegates accord- ing to the IEC</u>	<u>Delegates according to our proposal</u>
American	1,600	6	4
Russia	several members	3	1
China	100	3	4
India	600	4	4
England	400	4	4
France	1,000	5	4
Germany	50	3	4
Spain	60	2	2
Italy	800	4	3
Holland	50	2	4
Belgium	50	2	2
Austria	50	2	2
Greece	500	3	2
Canada	50	2	4
Mexico	60	2	2
Brazil	50	2	3
Argentina	50	2	2
Chile	300	3	2
Bolivia	200	2	4
Indo-China	300	3	4
Norway	50	1	4
Denmark	50	1	2
Switzerland	50	1	2
Bulgaria	50	1	2
Ireland	50	1	2
Palestine	50	1	2
Egypt	50	1	2
Cyprus	50	1	2
Cuba	100	1	2
Peru	50	1	4
Uruguay	50	1	2
Australia	50	1	2
So. Africa	300	2	2
Totals	7,220	73	91

It can be seen that our proposal assures a more democratic representation at the Congress, the economic weaknesses of the distant and poor sections being compensated for by a larger representation for the small sections in general and especially the sections which will not be able to send their delegates to the Congress much less vote, while the IEC acts inversely and systematically discriminates against them in order to favor its combinations. This resolution of the IEC constitutes an immediate and mortal danger to the whole International. It must be revoked.

We are witnessing, as has been seen, an attempted bureaucratic seizure of the International leadership by elements interested in



stifling a loyal discussion which would provoke their overthrow. It cannot be a question of anything else. Let us recall under what conditions the Pre-Conference of April, 1946 was convened and the motives for its convocation.

The IS and the IEC, which had been designated at the emergency conference of 1940 had only a vegetative political existence and led an almost non-existent organic activity during the whole war, the functioning of these bodies having been paralyzed by personal and political struggles in the atmosphere of the American section. As early as 1944 the Spanish Group in Mexico demanded the convening of a World Congress. Its request found not a single echo. The following year the IEC was consulted on the possibility of the convening of a pre-conference with limited objectives. This pre-conference proposal was accepted, for it was the only possible way of resolving the situation of an IS which was incapable, because of its internal divisions, of organizing a real discussion and preparing a genuine World Congress. It was then explicitly understood that this gathering would have as its task the selection of new leading bodies whose principal mission would be to animate and extend the international discussion in view of the World Congress. Then -- total silence. After that, no one in the International was informed of the place and the date of meeting of the projected pre-conference, no discussion or even exchange of views preceded it, the agenda was unknown to almost the whole International. Members of the IEC were uninformed while the French police were perfectly informed. Everything was organized in the dark by leaders interested in assuring themselves the hegemony in this gathering. The composition of the pre-conference, in addition, was as little democratic as possible, which was excusable given the conditions under which it was convened. But its non-democratic, not to say, anti-democratic character ought to have encouraged the leading bodies which it had elected to compensate for their origin by measures authentically democratic. It is precisely the opposite which we have witnessed. Hardly had it got together when this pre-conference proclaimed itself a conference under the pretext of throwing dust in the eyes of the outside world and issued a manifesto which claimed to introduce the international discussion which it was charged with opening. Then the IS and the IEC began to threaten expulsion and to legislate as if they were the product of a genuine conference delegated full powers by the International; in a word, they began to prepare the future World Congress majority, totally forgetting their principal mission: the loyal organization of a full discussion of all the problems posed before our International and the working class movement. They have even so completely forgotten their task that in all the discussion bulletins published under their guidance, more than a year after the pre-conference, of all the principal problems which confront our movement, only one, the Russian problem, has been extensively treated, and it still reflects only the official opinion. To our knowledge, only extracts from a thesis of the anti-defensist minority have been published. Can that be called a full and loyal discussion in preparation for a World Congress after seven years of a war which has produced changes of major importance? No, the discussion has, in its entirety, still to be organized.



### The Strangulation of Minorities

We affirm that the IS and the IEC are seeking to prepare their majority at the World Congress. In addition to the calculations which we have already unmasked what shows it clearly is the minute care they have taken to secure a maximum limitation of representation for minorities, both in number and in power. The next to the last part of paragraph three of the resolution of the IEC says:

"Minorities will be proportionally represented in cases where the number of delegates permits it. In other cases, all minorities constituting approximately a quarter of their sections at least will be represented with a consultative vote."

First of all, proportional representation of minorities, if it is placed alongside of the arbitrary representation of the sections criticized earlier, is only a snare. What minorities could be proportionally represented? Obviously those of countries of first importance and yet not all, since that of the American section would have only the satisfaction of revealing its theses. The resolution clearly suggests: "In cases where the number of delegates permits it." For it is obviously not the Peruvian, Polish or Austrian sections, for example, which will have a sufficient number of delegates so that one of them can represent the minority. These sections in countries "of first importance," in addition to the privilege of importance, find themselves granted an additional privilege by the IEC, the luxury, so to speak, of one or more minorities. Precisely among these sections is numbered that of the most imperialist country in the world, and the PCI of France, where the Craipeau majority and the Frank minority have no serious political differences. Moreover, why is a fourth and not a third or fifth of the members required and why is only a consultative vote given? The resolution does not deign to inform us. What it signifies, we may already know. The reason probably is that there is not a single section at the present moment, thanks to the good offices of the IS, where the minority represents a quarter of the membership, except the French minority led by Frank, who is under the guardianship of the present world leadership.

Nevertheless, the present International leadership is going to be obliged to permit a little discussion to take place, in order to save appearances. The minorities will more or less have the illusion of a discussion, but from now until the end of the year they will not have the time to develop and group themselves, since the IS and the IEC have evaded all discussion of the major questions; these minorities will therefore not have the time to win a quarter of the members of their sections. Moreover, even if they reached that proportion, most of the non-European sections would be incapable, as we have already stated, of sending all the majority delegates to which they were entitled, not to speak of the minority delegates. Thus, the stifling of the discussion organized



for more than a year by the International leadership, was designed to prevent the growing of an opposition in our movement. The demand for a quarter now gives the coup de grace to minorities in preventing them from being represented at the World Congress. And in case that were not sufficient, now comes the prohibition against proxy votes, and, in consequence, the forestalling of the growth of new formed oppositions, who are prevented from being heard and from voting. For a long time the IS has declared that the next World Congress must above all be a Congress of serious sections of the International. We now know what it understands by that: the sections which support or accept its opportunism, its ideological conservatism, and its organic bureaucratism.

Finally, to crown its work, the IEC in its resolution refuses to call the Congress legally on the pretext that the legal convening is "totally unrealizable under present conditions" and "would prevent the presence at the Congress of a series of sections and comrades." We cannot accept that statement; in fact, what prevents the convening of a legal Congress which would hold secret sessions in the course of which illegal comrades would be heard? The fear of bourgeois and Stalinist repression? But from how many countries has the authorization to hold a legal Congress been asked? Obviously, from not a single one. First of all, authorization must be asked everywhere for permission to hold a legal congress before taking refuge in conspiratorial methods. Secrecy, added to the restrictive methods already criticized, permit the leadership to combine and maneuver and assures that it will retain the leadership of the International. We confront you -- and, with us, the whole International will demand the withdrawal of your resolution, the beginning of a real discussion of major problems, and the preparation of a democratic congress.

#### For a Genuine World Congress

For the World Congress to represent real progress for the Fourth International, it is first of all necessary for it to be convened under such conditions that not a single comrade will have the slightest reason for thinking of maneuvering by the leadership. The theses of minorities must appear equally with those of majorities and must be distributed under the direction of the International leadership.

For the Congress to adopt resolutions which are necessary for the social revolution all minorities must be represented.

We therefore ask:

1. That the sections be represented on the basis of one delegate for every 25 members and additional fractions of 25 up to a maximum of four delegates for each section, minorities being represented in the same manner. However, only minorities representing at least 20% of the membership of their section will have the right to vote. Others will have only a consultative vote. It is

in this fashion that the democratic example given us by the CI at its birth will be followed.\*

2. Sections and minorities will have the right to transmit their vote to sections, minorities, or comrades outside their section.

3. Organizations close to the Fourth International with differences on this or that point of our program will be invited to the Congress with the same rights as the official sections, on condition of recognizing the fundamental principles of the International, even if fusion with the official sections has not been realized before the opening of the Congress.

4. The agenda will comprise:

- A. Examination of the politics of the principal parties during the imperialist war and their position in regard to the national resistance movements during the Nazi occupation;
- B. Character of the war between China and Japan;
- C. Balance sheet of the Spanish civil war;
- D. Support or abandonment of the unconditional defense of Russia and the question of world Stalinism (SP-CP-CGT government, united front with Stalinism, etc.);
- E. Outmoding of, or timeliness of, the transitional program and the manner of application of the parts of the program which remain valid;
- F. Problem of the tactics of the construction of revolutionary parties;
- G. Colonial question;
- H. Nature of the present historic period and immediate revolutionary perspectives.

This agenda is not at all exclusive. All questions of general interest which this or that section or group of comrades would like to present for the examination of the Congress will be discussed there.

We call upon the whole International to express themselves on the preceding proposals.

\*At the emergency conference of 1940 Comrade Munis representing Spain was authorized to represent Mexico, Argentina, and Chile on the recommendation of L.D.



If the World Congress meets under the conditions decided by the IEC, and even under better conditions, without a thorough preliminary discussion of the problems which confront our movement (see our open letter to the French PCI) the Congress will constitute a mortal blow for the Fourth International. The situation demands the energetic intervention of the sections and of comrades within the sections. The IEC must immediately withdraw its resolutions; otherwise the Fourth International will be bureaucratically asphyxiated.

For the revocation of the decision of the IEC or the resignation of the International leadership!

For a free discussion in the International!

For a genuine Congress of the International organized on democratic bases!

Long live the Fourth International!

Long live the world socialist revolution!

Mexico, D.F.  
June 27, 1947

N.B. Sections, groups of comrades, or individuals who share our criticisms and proposals are asked to communicate their complete or partial agreement immediately to the IS and to the following address: G. Munis, Apartado Postal 8942, Mexico, D.F.

OPEN LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY,  
FRENCH SECTION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Esteemed Comrades:

Two years after the termination of the most devastating and reactionary war which history records, the French party faces a grave crisis, a concentrated expression of the crisis of the International, the latter in turn a reflection of the tremendous crisis which the world labor movement is suffering each year more acutely. It is therefore necessary to judge the actual situation of the French party and to seek a solution in the operation of its two determinant causes, the Fourth International and the world labor movement.

"The crisis of humanity," we repeat a thousand times with L.D.Trotsky, "is a crisis of revolutionary leadership." However many explanations may try to throw the responsibility for the defeat of the revolution on the objective conditions, the ideological backwardness or the delusions of the masses, on the potency of Stalinism or the illusory attractiveness of the "degenerated workers' state," they are erroneous and fit only for exculpating those responsible, diverting attention from the real problem and obstructing its solution. Given the state of the objective conditions today for the taking of power, an authentic revolutionary leadership must conquer all obstacles, overcome all difficulties, triumph over all adversaries. The condition of the party in France, center of Europe and even now the influential nucleus of the world is in no way satisfactory. To speak fully and explicitly, since it is necessary to speak fully and explicitly if we wish to make progress, the condition of the French party signifies for us, and consequently for the proletariat, the revolution and all of humanity, a major calamity. Having gone through an imperialist war which offered unsurpassable conditions for its transformation into civil war; in the presence of an arch-reactionary policy of the Big Three conquerors; in the midst of a complete corruption of Stalinism and reformism; with the decadence of capitalism which threatens to drag down the whole of humanity with it already begun; with a proletariat avid for social revolution in spite of the evanescence to which the Stalinist and reformist leaders subject it; the French party does not yet represent a hope for the masses. No subterfuge; the fault is in the political leadership. Remember the French revolution. In its culminating period it shot the generals guilty of defeat, rejecting extenuating and even exculpatory reasons. Today we must mercilessly rout the policy and the exponents of the policy which brought about our defeat or even prevented triumph. Reasons much more imperious than those which compelled the French revolution to shoot the generals guilty of ineptitude demand this.

The world labor movement ought to have triumphed over the old capitalist world and the Russian counter-revolution during the



imperialist war or immediately afterward. The war was simultaneously a result of the crisis of the world labor movement and the opportunity for its recovery and definitive victory. The ideological causes of the crisis and with them the organizations responsible for it should have been destroyed. But a reverse phenomenon has been produced. The organizations which caused and heightened the crisis have increased their organic power over the working class, binding it more strongly than before to the general system of the world counter-revolution. We, on the other hand, have nowhere attained the organic force, the ideological authority and the combative prestige which give a revolutionary party its qualification as such. This result cannot be in any way accidental and still less a product of the objective circumstances. The crisis of the world labor movement acquired official status in 1914, when the Second International deserted to the capitalist camp. The Russian Revolution, in 1917 vigorously started the recuperation. But shortly afterward the Stalinist Thermidor arrived to add its own factors of ideological crisis to the old reformist factor. Since then Stalinism has been continually deepening its degeneration, getting prestige from the country of the revolution and money and stringent orders from the caste which has destroyed that same revolution. The social-democratic desertion was serious, very serious, and costly to the proletariat, but the intransigence of the Bolsheviks diminished its importance and the triumph of the Russian proletariat doomed it to a certain and early defeat. By turning against the Russian Revolution and chaining to itself the Third International, the Stalinist Thermidor coincided with the social-democratic desertion, obstructed the complete recuperation of the workers' movement and immediately itself deepened the crisis. From the Chinese Revolution to the Spanish Revolution, Stalinist foreign policy runs its degenerative cycle, which begins in complicity (ideological opportunism) with the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang and culminates in the destruction by its own hand (capitalist reaction) of a triumphant revolution, that of July 19, 1936. In this cycle there is a duplication of the evolution of Stalinist Thermidor in Russia which goes from the suppression of proletarian democracy and the Left Opposition to the extermination of the Bolshevik Old Guard and tens of thousands of militants, the Moscow Trials and the assassination of Trotsky, a retarded effect of the trials. The Russian government and its external appendage, world Stalinism, left the old social-democracy far behind, both having converted themselves, closely united, into the most powerful and dangerous cause of the crisis of the world labor movement. A cause which, furthermore, has at its disposal the GPU, a police force internationally organized and subsidized with millions!

The first point to understand in the world situation, without which understanding all the rest becomes fogged and action grows sterile, is that the present Russian state and government, far from having as its base or carrying along with it any remnant whatsoever of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, represents in respect to the latter the most ferocious and complete counter-revolution. By itself, alone the present Russian government has contributed

much more to the defeat of the world revolution and to the state of prostration of the masses than all the old capitalist governments together. Yes, the politics of Russia, and world Stalinism, image of its economic interests, dishearten human hopes and aspirations much more severely than the finance capital of Wall Street and the City with their respective armies and police forces. Without Moscow and world Stalinism, the imperialist war would either not have begun, that is, it would have been prevented by the European revolution, or it would have been rapidly and victoriously transformed into civil war. The spontaneous action of the masses under the Nazi occupation moved in the latter direction, but Stalinism and world capitalism, in a formidable show of unity, detoured them to the support of the imperialist war by means of nationalist movements. Thus we find ourselves today facing the most complete and reactionary domination of the world by the victorious Big Three, which means the continual threat of a new imperialist war and gives the masses a bitter sensation of frustration, a pledge of Stalinist and reformist domination. The crisis of the world labor movement thereby resolves itself into Stalinism's organic capacity (social-democracy is completely secondary) to nail the activity of the masses during and after the war into the sarcophagus built jointly in spite of their quarrels, by the old imperialisms and the Russian counter-revolution.

In its quality as regenerating nucleus, the Fourth International ought to have developed as the world party fighting for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war and adapted its tactics, general arguments and slogans to the changes which were produced or clearly manifested during the war. Mistakes uncorrected in any of these aspects and persistence in tactics and slogans superseded by events must inevitably have resulted in grave political and organic injury to the International. It cannot be doubted for a single instant that the latter is the principal cause of our feeble development and the particular crisis which the International is undergoing, a crisis expressed by diverse tendencies and sub-tendencies with points of view contradictory and even radically opposed on the most important problems. Yes, the International, or its principal parties in the period in which it did not exist as a directing center, have committed grave errors and persisted in slogans which ought to have been abandoned. But the major error is that to this very day it does not appear disposed to correct past mistakes and to abandon outlived slogans. And against this everyone must be alert, because it could prove disastrous.

Let us take up the main problems in chronological order.

The fight against imperialist war. One can scarcely speak of the International in respect to this, because the international center, isolated, cut off from any contact with all the sections in Europe and Asia, was practically non-existent. But it is possible to speak, on the other hand, of the principal parties. The most visible of them all, the one which by its geographic position, its economic resources, its conditions of



legality and its capacity to influence and attract, appeared automatically as exponent of the policy of the Fourth International -- did that party maintain an intransigent revolutionary and internationalist attitude toward the imperialist war? Did it wage the necessary struggle against it? No, categorically no. Any other reply would only serve to render difficult a positive solution to our difficulties, if not to aggravate them. Faced with war, the American party had an opportunist attitude similar to that of centrism, not to that which must be ours. It itself defined this as non-support, transformation of the imperialist war into a genuine war against fascism, political opposition, etc., and in general abstained from agitation and specific action against the war, as much in the rearguard, as in the vanguard. And the policy of this party appeared before the world for years as the official policy of the Fourth International! Furthermore, what then existed as an international center accepted it tacitly as sound. Evidently, the policy of the American party led all of the groups of the Fourth International in the world toward opportunism. By following its example, or at least taking shelter behind it, the English party itself, although in general to the left of the American party, weakened its policy toward war in a centrist fashion. There were other opportunist manifestations, but we do not consider it necessary to speak of them here. It is sufficient to point to the fact for later discussions. Did our principal parties on the European continent maintain a completely internationalist attitude toward the war? There is nothing to reproach them with, up to the Hitlerite occupation. From then onwards, their policy is almost entirely unknown to us and therefore we wish to assert nothing one way or the other. We must note, nevertheless, that diverse indications and some documents suggest, in the French party, for example, the existence of non-internationalist attitudes. The comrades who continued the general struggle for the revolution around our ideas under frightful conditions during the occupation have become the creditors of the esteem and admiration of the entire International. To all of them, the fallen and those who survive, go our sincerest respect and friendship. This itself obliges us to point out mistakes which today obstruct the growth of the organization and revolutionary progress in general. In order positively to resolve its crisis and to help to resolve that of the International, the French party must analyze its own conduct and that of the International during the imperialist war and condemn all opportunisms and vacillations.

The most serious error in this field proceeds from the new world leadership elected in the pre-Conference of April, 1946. To date, more than a year having elapsed it has not arranged for a discussion of the politics of the principal parties during the imperialist war. Its error is all the more unpardonable since it had at its disposal from the instant of its formation important documents with which to open the discussion. Its error can be all the more fatal for our movement in so far as this new leadership resists placing as the first point on the agenda for the world Congress in preparation the attitude of our principal parties

toward the imperialist war and the national movements. An error can be serious or even very serious; but a party which knows how to correct it will continue to progress toward the revolution. An uncorrected error produces theoretical consumption organic ossification, annulment, sooner or later. The Fourth International would demonstrate its inability to take itself seriously if, when the Congress is held, it did not place in the foreground the attitude of its parties toward the imperialist war and did not severely condemn the opportunisms manifested in its ranks. We are certain that the parties and groups will know how to react.

The movements of national resistance under the Hitlerite occupation. There are positions of all shades in the International, from those who have openly supported the Committees of Resistance, demanding the entry of our parties into them, to those who opposed any compromise with them, leaving aside those who favored them more or less surreptitiously. Because the occupation -- yesterday by the German troops, today by the Yankee, Russian and English -- is a new phenomenon posed for the labor movement by the decomposition of capitalism, up to a certain point it was natural that many varied positions should arise in our ranks. They would certainly have appeared even supposing that all our parties had maintained an integrally internationalist attitude. But the latter has not been the case; instead there have been opportunist tendencies which discarded revolutionary defeatism and internationalist tendencies which maintained it in every instance. All of the positions which arose round about the national movements can be catalogued under these headings. The opportunist tendencies supported and pronounced themselves more or less in favor, and the internationalist tendencies decidedly against. The former considered the fight against the occupation as a function of "the anti-fascist war"; the latter as a function of the imperialist war. As a consequence, the former saw in the resistance movements a positive element in the struggle against fascism, and the others an element of return to the imperialist war which the peoples had begun to transform into civil war. One group supported guerilla warfare and sabotage, instruments of the national movements, while the other combated them as nationalist methods incompatible with the supreme objective of transforming the imperialist war into international civil war.

The problem is not one of exclusively retrospective merit. The attitude taken today toward Russian and world Stalinism depends in great measure on the attitude taken previously toward the national movements, of which Stalinism was everywhere the principal inspirer, from Poland and Yugoslavia to France and Belgium. Even today Europe is totally occupied by the Big Three. It is therefore absolutely impossible to have a correct attitude toward the occupation by the Big Three without correcting the mistakes committed during the German occupation, because the occupation, despite quantitative differences, is not a characteristic result of this or that imperialism, but of imperialism as a world factor in the present epoch, the Russian counter-revolution being included under



the imperialist denomination. The problem is indissolubly linked with that of the imperialist war and therefore both ought to be at the top of the discussion in each party and in the future World Congress. Without correcting the errors committed in these aspects we shall never be a genuine world revolutionary party and any organic progress will slip through our fingers as so much has slipped through the fingers of the centrist parties.

"Unconditional Defense of the USSR." It is not, as some tendencies unfortunately seem to consider it, absolutely consubstantial with our movement. The criterion which has always determined our attitude toward this problem is: does the defense of the USSR in a war against foreign enemies help or hinder the world revolution? The answer depended naturally on the criterion held as to the social nature of the USSR, whether something of the October Revolution did or did not remain which merited its defense. It is impossible for us to analyze this problem here. We must proceed by declarations since we are attempting solely to make the entire International think and discuss. The development of Russian foreign policy while the armies of the Kremlin were advancing toward the west revealed a more and more acute contradiction with the "degenerated workers' state" idea based on the remnants of the proletarian revolution, on which rested the idea of unconditional defense. With deep distress, because the world leadership is a part of our organization, a part of ourselves, we cannot refrain from saying that the International Secretariat failed in its most elemental duties by not bringing up for discussion on the day following its constitution the question of whether the "unconditional defense of the USSR" continued to be favorable to the world revolution or whether it seemed incompatible with it in the light of the tremendous supervening events. The IS simply ignored the tremendous events and continued tacitly to accept unconditional defense as sufficient, in which acceptance it devoted itself to influencing the International. Without doing anything here besides making assertions, we repeat, we declare to you, comrades of the French party, comrades of the International, that the "unconditional defense of the USSR" has revealed itself to be incompatible with the defense of the world revolution. Abandonment of the defense of Russia is of utmost urgency, because it is fettering all of our movements, blunting our theoretical progress and giving us in the eyes of the masses a stalinoid physiognomy. It is impossible to defend Russia and the world revolution at the same time. Either one or the other. We pronounce ourselves for the world revolution, against the defense of Russia, and we ask you to pronounce yourselves in the same way. Be careful, above all, of those tendencies which hide their opportunism towards the imperialist war and the present situation by boasting about their fidelity to the program of the Fourth International on the Russian question! A fidelity of this kind is a destructive fidelity, similar to that of the "old Bolsheviks" in 1917 in respect to the old theory, completely bolshevik, of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry toward which Lenin appeared as a revisionist. In order to remain faithful to the revolutionary tradition of bolshevism,

Lenin broke with essential ideas of bolshevism, effecting a prior revolution in his party which made possible the October revolution. In order to be faithful to the revolutionary tradition of the Fourth International, we must abandon the Trotskyist theory of the defense of the USSR; we shall thus bring about in the International an ideological revolution indispensable for the success of the world revolution.

This is, beyond doubt, the most important question in dispute inside our movement, because all else depends upon it, in greater or less degree. If the tendency opposed to the defense of Russia can be accused of revisionism, its revisionism has the same character as Lenin's revisionism in 1917. On the other hand, out of the tendency supporting the defense of Russia if it does not rectify itself, will emerge a new reformism, such as was already emerging from the "old bolsheviks" when Lenin intervened with his April theses. In fact, the supporters of defense come to the conclusion that the counter-revolutionary Russian caste, upon entering the countries of western Europe and Asia, "is obliged" to expropriate capitalism and put the economy on the road of adaptation to the forms of property existing in Russia, forms which they themselves still consider socialist, produced by the revolution. When Thorez, Togliatti and other Stalinist leaders referred to the "new routes" offered by achieving socialism without the need of revolution, they had in mind, grosso modo, this same idea. But the supposed expropriation of capitalism consists in nationalization -- whether more or less complete, with or without indemnification, is not important -- of the means of production. On one hand, the nationalization is an automatic result of the concentration of capitalism in its epoch of involution, that is to say, degeneration and decay. On the other hand, years ago the European proletariat became master of the means of production. By nationalizing these means the Russians performed -- as did also the English and Americans, either by this procedure or by giving them back to private capitalists -- an operation of expropriation of the proletariat. And thus it is that the supporters of "unconditional defense" have presented the expropriation of the proletariat, carried out by Russian troops with the aid of the Stalinist parties and reformists, as a progressive act, almost revolutionary, something which the proletariat should defend. Herein is contained potentially to say the least -- a completely reformist tendency.

Stalinists-Reformist Governments and United Fronts with Stalinism. In France this idea is expressed concretely by the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government, held in common by the Craipeau and Frank factions, which in addition share the potentially reformist theory of the defense of Russia and the majority of the ideas which are injurious to the French party.

On this question we must limit ourselves to declarations also since the analysis of each problem would not enter into the scope of an open letter. In its entirety, the position on this slogan depends on the position on the defense of Russia, and in a more



general way on the valuation of the present conditions of capitalism and the state of consciousness of the masses. When in 1917 the Bolsheviks enunciated the idea of a Menshevik government (oust the capitalist ministers from the government), they did it by taking into account on the one hand the deluded faith which the masses at that moment had in the Mensheviks and in bourgeois democracy; on the other hand they took into account the nature of the contradictions between the Mensheviks and the old classes which would cause the former, willy-nilly, to grant greater liberties to the masses and to the revolutionary vanguard in particular, which would allow the masses to condense their experience in organic forms and rise to higher stages of struggle. The existence of the soviets, legally allowed by the Kerensky government and in which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks participated in a united front, permitted this development.

Do such conditions exist today? Decidedly not, as regards social-democracy, and much more decidedly as regards Stalinism. We do not believe it necessary to point out here the conservative evolution of social-democracy in recent years: It has been simply a case of going from bad to worse.

Stalinism is today a thousand times more dangerous for the revolution because it represents the ideas and interests of a triumphant counter-revolution in Russia which offers the world and more immediately Europe, its experience, its power and its particular solution against the proletariat on the march toward socialism. The Stalinist parties are today mere representatives and disciples of the counter-revolution installed in the Kremlin. Compared with them, the Mensheviks of 1917 were very revolutionary. The slogans of united front and government of the workers' leaders constituted in Russia a whole at once inseparable from and derived from the forms of proletarian democracy existing in the soviets, which -- this is of the utmost importance -- were created and maintained with the collaboration of Mensheviks and revolutionary socialists. Stalinism is today absolutely incompatible with any proletarian democracy. Wherever organs of revolutionary power have emerged, from Spain to Warsaw, Paris and Milan, it has hastened to destroy them. Stalinism cannot allow the revolutionaries to speak. The tactic of a united front with it and the CP-SP-CGT government cannot facilitate in any way the creation of organs of democracy and proletarian power, and any government that is Stalinist or under Stalinist influence brings with it an imperious tendency to annihilate physically the revolutionary vanguard. It is therefore urgently necessary that the PCI and our international movement withdraw these two now outmoded slogans. Is not the example of eastern Europe eloquent?

On the other hand, the proletariat today does not suffer from any real delusions about bourgeois-democracy, social-democracy or Stalinism. What it does suffer from is the fact of finding itself imprisoned in the organic apparatus of both tendencies, Stalinism

much more to the defeat of the world revolution and to the state of prostration of the masses than all the old capitalist governments together. Yes, the politics of Russia, and world Stalinism, image of its economic interests, dishearten human hopes and aspirations much more severely than the finance capital of Wall Street and the City with their respective armies and police forces. Without Moscow and world Stalinism, the imperialist war would either not have begun, that is, it would have been prevented by the European revolution, or it would have been rapidly and victoriously transformed into civil war. The spontaneous action of the masses under the Nazi occupation moved in the latter direction, but Stalinism and world capitalism, in a formidable show of unity, detoured them to the support of the imperialist war by means of nationalist movements. Thus we find ourselves today facing the most complete and reactionary domination of the world by the victorious Big Three, which means the continual threat of a new imperialist war and gives the masses a bitter sensation of frustration, a pledge of Stalinist and reformist domination. The crisis of the world labor movement thereby resolves itself into Stalinism's organic capacity (social-democracy is completely secondary) to nail the activity of the masses during and after the war into the sarcophagus built jointly in spite of their quarrels, by the old imperialisms and the Russian counter-revolution.

In its quality as regenerating nucleus, the Fourth International ought to have developed as the world party fighting for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war and adapted its tactics, general arguments and slogans to the changes which were produced or clearly manifested during the war. Mistakes uncorrected in any of these aspects and persistence in tactics and slogans superseded by events must inevitably have resulted in grave political and organic injury to the International. It cannot be doubted for a single instant that the latter is the principal cause of our feeble development and the particular crisis which the International is undergoing, a crisis expressed by diverse tendencies and sub-tendencies with points of view contradictory and even radically opposed on the most important problems. Yes, the International, or its principal parties in the period in which it did not exist as a directing center, have committed grave errors and persisted in slogans which ought to have been abandoned. But the major error is that to this very day it does not appear disposed to correct past mistakes and to abandon outlived slogans. And against this everyone must be alert, because it could prove disastrous.

Let us take up the main problems in chronological order.

The fight against imperialist war. One can scarcely speak of the International in respect to this, because the international center, isolated, cut off from any contact with all the sections in Europe and Asia, was practically non-existent. But it is possible to speak, on the other hand, of the principal parties. The most visible of them all, the one which by its geographic position, its economic resources, its conditions of



legality and its capacity to influence and attract, appeared automatically as exponent of the policy of the Fourth International -- did that party maintain an intransigent revolutionary and internationalist attitude toward the imperialist war? Did it wage the necessary struggle against it? No, categorically no. Any other reply would only serve to render difficult a positive solution to our difficulties, if not to aggravate them. Faced with war, the American party had an opportunist attitude similar to that of centrism, not to that which must be ours. It itself defined this as non-support, transformation of the imperialist war into a genuine war against fascism, political opposition, etc., and in general abstained from agitation and specific action against the war, as much in the rearguard, as in the vanguard. And the policy of this party appeared before the world for years as the official policy of the Fourth International! Furthermore, what then existed as an international center accepted it tacitly as sound. Evidently, the policy of the American party led all of the groups of the Fourth International in the world toward opportunism. By following its example, or at least taking shelter behind it, the English party itself, although in general to the left of the American party, weakened its policy toward war in a centrist fashion. There were other opportunist manifestations, but we do not consider it necessary to speak of them here. It is sufficient to point to the fact for later discussions. Did our principal parties on the European continent maintain a completely internationalist attitude toward the war? There is nothing to reproach them with, up to the Hitlerite occupation. From then onwards, their policy is almost entirely unknown to us and therefore we wish to assert nothing one way or the other. We must note, nevertheless, that diverse indications and some documents suggest, in the French party, for example, the existence of non-internationalist attitudes. The comrades who continued the general struggle for the revolution around our ideas under frightful conditions during the occupation have become the creditors of the esteem and admiration of the entire International. To all of them, the fallen and those who survive, go our sincerest respect and friendship. This itself obliges us to point out mistakes which today obstruct the growth of the organization and revolutionary progress in general. In order positively to resolve its crisis and to help to resolve that of the International, the French party must analyze its own conduct and that of the International during the imperialist war and condemn all opportunisms and vacillations.

The most serious error in this field proceeds from the new world leadership elected in the pre-Conference of April, 1946. To date, more than a year having elapsed it has not arranged for a discussion of the politics of the principal parties during the imperialist war. Its error is all the more unpardonable since it had at its disposal from the instant of its formation important documents with which to open the discussion. Its error can be all the more fatal for our movement in so far as this new leadership resists placing as the first point on the agenda for the world Congress in preparation the attitude of our principal parties

toward the imperialist war and the national movements. An error can be serious or even very serious; but a party which knows how to correct it will continue to progress toward the revolution. An uncorrected error produces theoretical consumption organic ossification, annulment, sooner or later. The Fourth International would demonstrate its inability to take itself seriously if, when the Congress is held, it did not place in the foreground the attitude of its parties toward the imperialist war and did not severely condemn the opportunisms manifested in its ranks. We are certain that the parties and groups will know how to react.

The movements of national resistance under the Hitlerite occupation. There are positions of all shades in the International, from those who have openly supported the Committees of Resistance, demanding the entry of our parties into them, to those who opposed any compromise with them, leaving aside those who favored them more or less surreptitiously. Because the occupation -- yesterday by the German troops, today by the Yankee, Russian and English -- is a new phenomenon posed for the labor movement by the decomposition of capitalism, up to a certain point it was natural that many varied positions should arise in our ranks. They would certainly have appeared even supposing that all our parties had maintained an integrally internationalist attitude. But the latter has not been the case; instead there have been opportunist tendencies which discarded revolutionary defeatism and internationalist tendencies which maintained it in every instance. All of the positions which arose round about the national movements can be catalogued under these headings. The opportunist tendencies supported and pronounced themselves more or less in favor, and the internationalist tendencies decidedly against. The former considered the fight against the occupation as a function of "the anti-fascist war"; the latter as a function of the imperialist war. As a consequence, the former saw in the resistance movements a positive element in the struggle against fascism, and the others an element of return to the imperialist war which the peoples had begun to transform into civil war. One group supported guerilla warfare and sabotage, instruments of the national movements, while the other combated them as nationalist methods incompatible with the supreme objective of transforming the imperialist war into international civil war.

The problem is not one of exclusively retrospective merit. The attitude taken today toward Russian and world Stalinism depends in great measure on the attitude taken previously toward the national movements, of which Stalinism was everywhere the principal inspirer, from Poland and Yugoslavia to France and Belgium. Even today Europe is totally occupied by the Big Three. It is therefore absolutely impossible to have a correct attitude toward the occupation by the Big Three without correcting the mistakes committed during the German occupation, because the occupation, despite quantitative differences, is not a characteristic result of this or that imperialism, but of imperialism as a world factor in the present epoch, the Russian counter-revolution being included under



the imperialist denomination. The problem is indissolubly linked with that of the imperialist war and therefore both ought to be at the top of the discussion in each party and in the future World Congress. Without correcting the errors committed in these aspects we shall never be a genuine world revolutionary party and any organic progress will slip through our fingers as so much has slipped through the fingers of the centrist parties.

"Unconditional Defense of the USSR." It is not, as some tendencies unfortunately seem to consider it, absolutely consubstantial with our movement. The criterion which has always determined our attitude toward this problem is: does the defense of the USSR in a war against foreign enemies help or hinder the world revolution? The answer depended naturally on the criterion held as to the social nature of the USSR, whether something of the October Revolution did or did not remain which merited its defense. It is impossible for us to analyze this problem here. We must proceed by declarations since we are attempting solely to make the entire International think and discuss. The development of Russian foreign policy while the armies of the Kremlin were advancing toward the west revealed a more and more acute contradiction with the "degenerated workers' state" idea based on the remnants of the proletarian revolution, on which rested the idea of unconditional defense. With deep distress, because the world leadership is a part of our organization, a part of ourselves, we cannot refrain from saying that the International Secretariat failed in its most elemental duties by not bringing up for discussion on the day following its constitution the question of whether the "unconditional defense of the USSR" continued to be favorable to the world revolution or whether it seemed incompatible with it in the light of the tremendous supervening events. The IS simply ignored the tremendous events and continued tacitly to accept unconditional defense as sufficient, in which acceptance it devoted itself to influencing the International. Without doing anything here besides making assertions, we repeat, we declare to you, comrades of the French party, comrades of the International, that the "unconditional defense of the USSR" has revealed itself to be incompatible with the defense of the world revolution. Abandonment of the defense of Russia is of utmost urgency, because it is fettering all of our movements, blunting our theoretical progress and giving us in the eyes of the masses a stalinoid physiognomy. It is impossible to defend Russia and the world revolution at the same time. Either one or the other. We pronounce ourselves for the world revolution, against the defense of Russia, and we ask you to pronounce yourselves in the same way. Be careful, above all, of those tendencies which hide their opportunism towards the imperialist war and the present situation by boasting about their fidelity to the program of the Fourth International on the Russian question! A fidelity of this kind is a destructive fidelity, similar to that of the "old Bolsheviks" in 1917 in respect to the old theory, completely bolshevik, of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry toward which Lenin appeared as a revisionist. In order to remain faithful to the revolutionary tradition of bolshevism,

Lenin broke with essential ideas of bolshevism, effecting a prior revolution in his party which made possible the October revolution. In order to be faithful to the revolutionary tradition of the Fourth International, we must abandon the Trotskyist theory of the defense of the USSR; we shall thus bring about in the International an ideological revolution indispensable for the success of the world revolution.

This is, beyond doubt, the most important question in dispute inside our movement, because all else depends upon it, in greater or less degree. If the tendency opposed to the defense of Russia can be accused of revisionism, its revisionism has the same character as Lenin's revisionism in 1917. On the other hand, out of the tendency supporting the defense of Russia if it does not rectify itself, will emerge a new reformism, such as was already emerging from the "old bolsheviks" when Lenin intervened with his April theses. In fact, the supporters of defense come to the conclusion that the counter-revolutionary Russian caste, upon entering the countries of western Europe and Asia, "is obliged" to expropriate capitalism and put the economy on the road of adaptation to the forms of property existing in Russia, forms which they themselves still consider socialist, produced by the revolution. When Thorez, Togliatti and other Stalinist leaders referred to the "new routes" offered by achieving socialism without the need of revolution, they had in mind, grosso modo, this same idea. But the supposed expropriation of capitalism consists in nationalization -- whether more or less complete, with or without indemnification, is not important -- of the means of production. On one hand, the nationalization is an automatic result of the concentration of capitalism in its epoch of involution, that is to say, degeneration and decay. On the other hand, years ago the European proletariat became master of the means of production. By nationalizing these means the Russians performed -- as did also the English and Americans, either by this procedure or by giving them back to private capitalists -- an operation of expropriation of the proletariat. And thus it is that the supporters of "unconditional defense" have presented the expropriation of the proletariat, carried out by Russian troops with the aid of the Stalinist parties and reformists, as a progressive act, almost revolutionary, something which the proletariat should defend. Herein is contained potentially to say the least -- a completely reformist tendency.

Stalinists-Reformist Governments and United Fronts with Stalinism. In France this idea is expressed concretely by the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government, held in common by the Craipeau and Frank factions, which in addition share the potentially reformist theory of the defense of Russia and the majority of the ideas which are injurious to the French party.

On this question we must limit ourselves to declarations also since the analysis of each problem would not enter into the scope of an open letter. In its entirety, the position on this slogan depends on the position on the defense of Russia, and in a more



general way on the valuation of the present conditions of capitalism and the state of consciousness of the masses. When in 1917 the Bolsheviks enunciated the idea of a Menshevik government (oust the capitalist ministers from the government), they did it by taking into account on the one hand the deluded faith which the masses at that moment had in the Mensheviks and in bourgeois democracy; on the other hand they took into account the nature of the contradictions between the Mensheviks and the old classes which would cause the former, willy-nilly, to grant greater liberties to the masses and to the revolutionary vanguard in particular, which would allow the masses to condense their experience in organic forms and rise to higher stages of struggle. The existence of the soviets, legally allowed by the Kerensky government and in which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks participated in a united front, permitted this development.

Do such conditions exist today? Decidedly not, as regards social-democracy, and much more decidedly as regards Stalinism. We do not believe it necessary to point out here the conservative evolution of social-democracy in recent years: It has been simply a case of going from bad to worse.

Stalinism is today a thousand times more dangerous for the revolution because it represents the ideas and interests of a triumphant counter-revolution in Russia which offers the world and more immediately Europe, its experience, its power and its particular solution against the proletariat on the march toward socialism. The Stalinist parties are today mere representatives and disciples of the counter-revolution installed in the Kremlin. Compared with them, the Mensheviks of 1917 were very revolutionary. The slogans of united front and government of the workers' leaders constituted in Russia a whole at once inseparable from and derived from the forms of proletarian democracy existing in the soviets, which -- this is of the utmost importance -- were created and maintained with the collaboration of Mensheviks and revolutionary socialists. Stalinism is today absolutely incompatible with any proletarian democracy. Wherever organs of revolutionary power have emerged, from Spain to Warsaw, Paris and Milan, it has hastened to destroy them. Stalinism cannot allow the revolutionaries to speak. The tactic of a united front with it and the CP-SP-CGT government cannot facilitate in any way the creation of organs of democracy and proletarian power, and any government that is Stalinist or under Stalinist influence brings with it an imperious tendency to annihilate physically the revolutionary vanguard. It is therefore urgently necessary that the PCI and our international movement withdraw these two now outmoded slogans. Is not the example of eastern Europe eloquent?

On the other hand, the proletariat today does not suffer from any real delusions about bourgeois-democracy, social-democracy or Stalinism. What it does suffer from is the fact of finding itself imprisoned in the organic apparati of both tendencies, Stalinism

first and foremost. The non-existence of a revolutionary organization which would inspire it with confidence and combative sureness contributes more than a little to this, that is, our actual policy contributes directly or indirectly. Yesterday it was indispensable for the proletariat to go through the experiences of governments set up by the leaders of the traditional organizations in order to understand that the revolution was the only possible way out. Not today; you have to cover your eyes obstinately with your hands not to see it. The experience has been long and painful. The proletariat understands that there is no solution to its problems other than the revolution, but it is pessimistic and somewhat inert in the hands of the traditional organizations because it sees no other organization which offers serious possibilities of making this revolution. It would hardly break away from this pessimism and inertia if we, to whom it looks with a little hope, without our succeeding in inspiring it with the necessary confidence to take action, say that it ought nevertheless to see a Thorez government. Let us hope it will never see it! In order to inspire confidence in the proletariat and persuade it to action and to a break with the organizations which imprison it, the thing most indicated would be the creation of a united front of all those minority labor organizations which oppose class collaboration and are supporters of the revolution and proletarian democracy in general. Thus the proletariat would see a relatively solid nucleus which would break the asphyxiating circle drawn around it by Stalinism and reformism.

To sum up, the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government such as has been used in France, the call for a Stalinist-reformist government in general, is today entirely false and will serve only to hold back the masses where they are, and also -- it is painful but necessary to say it -- develop the new potentially reformist tendencies existing in the Fourth International. We cannot refrain from telling you, comrades of the International Communist Party of France, that the crisis of your party in particular and that of the International in general will not be solved positively by supporting the Frank faction against the Craipeau faction, but rather by supporting the two factions which are against the defense of Russia and against the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government. Fidelity to Trotskyism is not fidelity to the written word, but to the revolutionary spirit of Trotskyism. Between the two factions which today appear the strongest in France, the least bad will be that which offers the party a more democratic regime allowing it to carry out the political changes indispensable today through the widest and most democratic discussion.

Nationalizations. From all the foregoing, our opposition to the slogan of nationalization can be logically deduced. It also belongs in the realm of the written word, and far from expressing fidelity to the revolutionary Trotskyist tradition, it expresses or at least aids that which we have designated above as the new potential reformism. In revolutionary movements, nationalizations have served the Russian counter-revolution as well as the counter-



revolution of the purest bourgeois derivation to expropriate the proletariat as it was taking possession of the instruments of production, and in moments of passivity of the masses, to concentrate the property in the hands of the state, religious fetish and oppressor par excellence, so as to make strikes difficult, restrict democracy (Stalinist-reformist police in the French factories) and begin the creation of a corporative order. Against this senile slogan we must hoist that of the expropriation of capitalism and destruction of its State by democratically elected workers' committees. Every one of the situations and conflicts which arises between the proletariat and capitalism must reinforce in the workers the idea that nationalizations far from favoring their interests and those of the revolution in general, only aggravate the situation. The slogan of expropriation must become more comprehensible to the proletariat all the time. We believe that, in so far as its general meaning is concerned, it is already so.

The International has not had a revolutionary policy during the war, more exactly, it has had no policy. It slept while its most visible parties, principally the SWP followed an entirely opportunist policy of "revolutionary triumphism" toward the war at the same time that they pretended to set themselves up as trustees of fidelity to the program (what part of the program is more important than the struggle against war?), raising as their camp colors the defense of Russia above all else. We tell these tendencies which are not absent from the French party, that they have violated the most essential part of the program and that only a thorough, honest and critically undertaken correction will permit them to speak of fidelity to the program without sowing confusion. But there are also other tendencies whose fidelity to the program is more "genuine" who ought to keep a watch on themselves, for they run the risk of facilitating the International's remaining in the hands of the most opportunist tendencies which are dangerous on account of their organic strength -- and this would, very probably, mean its ideological death. Our program must be adapted to the gigantic changes brought about by the war. It is here where fidelity to it lies and not in unchanging repetition, and even less in partial repetition, discarding revolutionary defeatism and interpreting the rest in right-wing fashion.

The criminal destruction of the Spanish revolution principally at the hands of Stalinism and the subsequent beginning of the imperialist war mark the end of a stage which opened with the end of the former imperialist war and the triumph of the Russian revolution. Everything has undergone changes of great importance, the old capitalism and Stalinist Russia, the general attitude of the masses and their ideas or beliefs with respect to bourgeois democracy and traditional organizations. Europe is a vast prison, a torture-camp whose guards and torturers are sometimes German or Italian at other times Russian, American, English or French. A new stage has appeared in the implacable struggle of our epoch to find a revolutionary solution to its conflicts. Our program cannot be exactly the same as in the former stage. If it is to continue being equally revolutionary, it must be modified.

We do not doubt for a single instant that the fundamental cause of the crisis in the French party and the International can be summed up in the opportunisms of yesterday toward the imperialist war and the resistance movements plus ideological inertia in changing in time what needed to be changed. Today this inertia continues in full on the part of the new world leadership. The crisis will only be aggravated if it is not solved by adopting the changes indicated in this letter.

The Frank faction has had the party occupied for nearly a month in discussing an article entitled "The Party in Danger." As a matter of fact, the French party is in danger. But its crisis, as we pointed out at the beginning, is an expression of the crisis of the International, in turn connected with that of the labor movement. It is a problem of very concrete ideas and slogans of which the principal ones are explained in this document. The Frank faction is fully co-responsible for the crisis of the French party and of the International, and the PCI would be in as much or more danger if its leadership passed from the Craipeau faction to that of Frank. The danger stems from all those tendencies which have shown themselves indulgent toward the opportunisms committed during the war by the American party or by any other, and who continue to proclaim themselves supporters of the defense of Russia, a Stalinist-reformist government, a united front with Stalinism and nationalizations. The most important of those tendencies internationally, to which has been added the Frank faction, are the same which had an anti-fascist attitude and not an internationalist during the war. In no decisive aspect does the Frank faction differentiate itself from the Craipeau faction. Their real differences do not even merit separation into distinct factions. If one is opportunist toward Stalinism, the other is opportunist toward Stalinism; if one finds something progressive in the counter-revolution of the Kremlin, the other also, etc. They are indiscriminately part of the right-wing of the International.

The next congress of the International Communist party will have enormous importance for the future of our world movement. It is necessary that the problems posed here be duly discussed; in order to save the party, it is necessary that the entire party, including the Craipeau and Frank factions, realize the urgency of radically changing their positions on the points herein indicated; it is necessary to reconsider our transitional program in general and to put ourselves in a position energetically to aid the International in effecting its own ideological revolution. Whatever the divergences are between the two factions opposed to the defense of Russia and the slogan of a Stalinist-reformist government, through them can be glimpsed a positive solution to the crisis of the French party, a most important premise for solving the crisis of the International. It is the duty of these two factions to get along together and not help false left-wings in the International.

Once more: fidelity to Trotskyism is not the literal repetition of what Trotskyism said yesterday, even supposing it were



not distorted in a right-wing manner. Fidelity to Trotskyism is the firm, sincere, and courageous rectification of some of the assertions it made yesterday. The revolution also is revolutionary; it requires shifts, modifications and radical negations of its own former assertions. Yes, the revolution is also revolutionary!

Down with "Trotskyist" conservatism!

Down with "Trotskyist" fetishism!

Out with "unconditional defense" of the USSR!

For an ideologically firm and renewed International!

Long live the French proletarian revolution!

Long live the world revolution!

Long live the Fourth International!

Natalia Sedova-Trotsky  
Benjamin Peret  
G. Munis

Mexico, D.F.  
June, 1947

INDEX OF MY DISLOYALTY

By  
P. Munis

The word disloyalty has already been used against me several times by members of the present world leadership. I always let it pass, without paying attention to it or answering with accusations in kind. Nor will I now answer with accusations in kind, but instead of ignoring it I shall pause to consider it, for we are on the eve of a systematic campaign against me and the international tendency to which I belong, in which adjectives will dance in a tumultuous frenzy. And it will not be we who put them in circulation, now or later but the other tendency.

Recently, Comrade Smith hurled the word disloyalty at my head in a document which is going to be known in the entire International, a document which pretends to be a "Reply to Comrade Munis." My method, asserts Smith, "carries in all languages the qualification of disloyal. What does that method consist of? Of "concentrating all attacks against the IS and affecting to ignore that on all the important questions which concern the life of the International, it is not the IS, but the representative aggregate of the sections of the International, that is the IEC, which decides." If that accusation were correct, my method, more than disloyal, would be extremely stupid, and would not excite Comrade Smith and his tendency colleagues so much; it would do no more than inconvenience them, since a documentary proof of the fact on the part of the IS would be sufficient for all of the sections of the International to look upon us with non-confidence and antipathy.

Smith set out to write his "Reply to Comrade Munis" as a result of the document "Beware!" signed by me and Peralta. The latter document fundamentally criticized the IS because it does not distribute decisions taken by the IEC, but a report presented to a Plenum of the same by the International Secretariat. Perhaps Comrade Smith wanted us, as proof of loyalty, to attack the IEC and the entire International for words spoken by the IS? On the contrary, actually making a distinction between co-responsibles, Smith speaks of the document "Beware" as of something written by Munis "in collaboration with Comrade Peralta." If he is interested in perfecting his method, Smith should know that the document in question was written by Comrade Peralta in collaboration with Comrade Munis. Not for this does Munis refrain from accepting responsibility for each and every one of the words of the document.

Furthermore, Comrade Smith must have knowledge of a document of mine on the Spanish problems, entirely and exclusively directed against the IEC, since the latter supports the resolutions which I criticize and call for a struggle against. That alone is enough to demonstrate that the accusation of Smith is in the clouds and, let us say gratuitous, so as not to confuse it with the weighty criticisms that are directed at me. If more proof is absolutely neces-



sary, here are the documents: "The Fourth International in Danger" also directed against the IEC, and the "Open Letter to the PCI", wherein the International itself is seriously criticized, which having let events overtake it, today plays a conservative role. You must be advised, Comrade Smith, that neither the tendency to which I belong nor I personally am interested in making headway and obtaining a majority by making ideological concessions, by criticizing some and acquiescing unprincipledly to others in order to set them against each other, in a word, by maneuvering. Do you wish proof? Look at our "Open Letter to the PCI", where in regard to the national question above all, criticisms are made which pertain to two of the tendencies of the French party closest to our position. We did not make those criticisms without being aware of it, but intentionally, because we are not interested in a shapeless majority of compromise but one obtained by the most rigorous and complete discussion of all problems, without sparing anyone. If you or anyone else insists, I can cite several cases in which the tendency to which you belong has not comported itself in the same manner. As a warning for the future, permit me nevertheless to add, Comrade Smith, that we are certain of triumphing in the International, because sustained by our ideas, by not making any maneuver, we "maneuver" better than anyone. Let those who can, do likewise!

Let us examine soberly, with the indifference of a biologist who examines two organisms, the contents of the article of Smith in relation to the document "Beware" which this comrade appears to have set out to answer.

In "Beware" Peralta and I were criticizing the claim that the World Congress was, "before all else, the Congress of the organizations which have respected the international discipline and which maintain normal relations with the leading bodies." We established, with concrete examples, that everyone can see in our criticism, that the "normal relations" with the leading bodies must be understood in the political sense (internationalist attitude during the war) and not in the organizational sense, since almost all of the sections were not able to maintain even half-way normal relations with the leading bodies. We asked, in a word, that they confront the problem with a broad political criterion and not with a narrow organizational criterion. In the "Reply" of Comrade Smith there is not even a superficial allusion to our criticism.

We also asked to what conditions the world leadership referred in proposing that organizations which "place conditions to their belonging to the International" should not participate in the World Congress. In eight pages, Comrade Smith has not found space for a line of reply.

"The whole attitude of the IS" -- stated our document "Beware!" -- "on the preparatory discussion of the Congress shows the primitive greed of safeguarding the prestige of the leadership." By way of answer, Smith admonishes me: "Your articles, Comrade Munis, have been published in our press and your pamphlets have

been distributed by us to all the sections and organizations of the Fourth International." Smith would have been more convincing had he enumerated all the articles which he says have been published by the IS and those which were sent and not published. Unfortunately I cannot produce the statistics because I do not have my archives here. But in the Bulletins of the IS I have seen only two or three letters, some amendments to a Spanish document and two brief articles that even deserve a reply, although I must add that of these Bulletins, not even a half a dozen arrive in Mexico, thereby making it difficult to deal with the complete collection. Even if all were published, does that fact perhaps excuse the IS from the principal accusation we made: of not having put on the agenda, more than a year after its formation, the principal problems posed to our movement and to the proletariat generally? It is less excusable if more discussion Bulletins have appeared. And this gives us the right to demand of Smith that when he tries to accuse a comrade of disloyalty he do it by at least replying to the principal arguments of the accused.

The distribution of the pamphlets, which Smith mentions as testimony of the democratic scruples of the IS, is on the contrary, an unanswerable charge against him. One of the pamphlets, written more than three years ago, condemns as opportunist and centrist the policy followed by one of our principal parties. It was designed especially to begin a world discussion on the subject, of transcendental importance for the entire International. In Mexico we published not more than a thousand copies in Spanish, of which only a few dozen that remained could be sent to the IS when the latter was formed. In order that the discussion materialize on this point, which should be one of the first and main points at the World Congress, if the World Congress takes itself seriously, it was necessary to send the pamphlet to all the sections, at least in English and in French. But more than three years after having been written, more than a year after the world leadership was constituted, the pamphlet is ignored by almost the entire International. Or does Comrade Smith pretend to have us believe that the sending to each section of four or five copies in Spanish satisfies the necessities of discussion on this point and stamps the IS as having functioned democratically? We already stated in the article "Beware!" that up to now the International does not know what the policy of its principal parties towards the war and the national resistance movements was. And this is one of the accusations for which Smith, amidst justificatory soft-soap, calls me disloyal!

My pamphlet on Russia and Stalinism, another of the principal points to be discussed in the World Congress, was not published by the IS, granting that it had appeared in French in Mexico. In one of the Bulletins of the IS, a note especially pointed it out as material also for discussion without even indicating to the readers where they could obtain it, as if they were dealing with a work as well known and easily obtainable as "Don Quijote de la Mancha" or "Gargantua and Pantagruel." The French edition in Mexico did not even exceed a thousand copies. It is impossible that the IS



distributed the pamphlet in the same form and number as its Bulletins and, furthermore, the necessities of the discussion demanded that the principal arguments be answered, if possible in the same length, by the official tendency. That the French edition in Mexico was not the real reason why the IS refused to publish my pamphlet is irrefutably demonstrated by the following fact: the Bulletins of the IS on the Russian problem were translated into English and edited by the SWP. In this case the French edition published in Mexico could not be offered as argument not to include my pamphlet in the English translations. Nevertheless, in the American Bulletins there appeared the same note of the IS, vaguely indicating the pamphlet as material for discussion. To deduce from all this that the IS directs the discussion by preoccupying itself primarily with safeguarding the prestige of the leadership, is considered an act of disloyalty by Comrade Smith, who only repeats the words of other colleagues of his tendency.

Therefore, the only thing in Smith's eight pages that could be taken with much good will, as a reply to our concrete accusations, confirms rather than negates our criticisms in respect to the attitude of the IS toward the problem of the discussion in general. But let us continue.

Under the title "Beware!", we repeated for the nth time that the first point on the order of the day of the World Congress would have to be the attitude of our principal parties toward the imperialist war and the national resistance movements. Why have not the IS and Smith in his eight pages against me replied concretely yes or no to this demand? Because being unable to refuse to discuss this problem, they pretend to include it within the general report which the IS will submit to the Congress. Thus encircled by many other problems, the problem of the attitude toward the imperialist war and the national movements can be discussed only precipitously and with very limited time. No one in the IS has given reasons for making this encirclement. But its report to the Plenum of the IEC, to which "Beware!" refers, can only be interpreted as a formal denial. For his part, Smith again answers by silence, as on the problems enumerated above.

The same thing happens with the problems of the legality or illegality of the World Congress and the necessity of prior discipline for the Congress. Our position in respect to the latter is part of what Smith calls my disloyalty, but Smith does not consider himself obliged to take it into account. Why did you write eight pages, Comrade Smith -- to reply to me or to apologize for the IS? You do not reply to me; you do make an apology for the IS. Without following the example of your crude explanation let me say to you: rectify your method, because by your means you will only succeed in embroiling the International still more.

There is, however, one point of the document "Beware!" which Comrade Smith does answer. It is a point in which he and the IS are right and he exploits it for almost an entire page. Peralta

and I said that the IS supported L. Red in Mexico because it was completely in agreement with him, and that is not true. The reports are slower in circulating inside the city of Mexico than between the latter and Europe. But the right which helps Smith here is almost a wrong, because the Red matter would have been solved almost immediately after it arose, if it had not been inflated and nicely converted into a "case" by the IS and its close allies on this continent. Now it has to admit that L. Red does not have an effective group, after having invented the Red Group. It is no surprise to us that after having been the indulged, centrifugal candidate of the IS, by virtue of opposition to the effective group which Jorge Santiago, until now centrifugal candidate, leads, the roles were reversed and subsequently the epithet petit-bourgeois fell upon the first, yesterday considered "proletarian," and the second was raised to the category of official proletariat. In any event, let my warning against those who abuse terminology in order to fill their ideological vacuum be posed here. I repeat that the present leading faction has already begun very seriously to abuse it, and if we do not succeed in halting it, it will replace ideas with empty sound at which everyone will finally shrug his shoulders. Outside of that, let us add that if the discussion and the conditions of celebration of the World Congress permit it, words will again assume their true meaning and opportunists will not continue to wear proletarian clothing.

There is still one point which, as presented by Comrade Smith, seems to prove him entirely right and to prove irrevocably that in the document "Beware!" Peralta and I distorted the truth deliberately. I refer to a circular of the IS to the Latin American sections, written in February 22 of this year. We placed it in the document referred to, "Beware!", as an example of the restrictions which the IS was trying to impose on the participation in the World Congress by the Latin American sections and all the small sections or groups generally. Smith counterposes to our assertion a resolution of the October Plenum of last year which says absolutely nothing definitive in this respect. On the other hand there was indeed something definitive after the February 22 circular and before Smith took the trouble to answer me. If Smith did not consider it necessary to take it into account, it is doubtlessly because, in respect to method, it is not so necessary with himself as with me. The resolution of the IEC of last March on the preparation of the World Congress, prohibited the transmission of mandates of one section to the other which if carried out, would keep the majority of the small sections and unofficial groups and even some of the large sections outside the World Congress and without voting rights. That resolution of the IEC abundantly confirms the warning which Peralta and I made in "Beware!" However, Smith tries to squirm out of it, here is the fact, incontestable, proving us right, and which furthermore does not leave my method of discussion and criticism in a bad light but rather Smith and those who are behind him.

Finally, as though to annihilate me, Smith writes: "In reality, all this artificial noise that you make, Comrade Munis, about our so-called "Bureaucratism," our "maneuvers," etc. . . . is



explained by the fact that what you want to attack in us is above all our politics."

The conduct which Smith attributes to me here is not my conduct towards the political problems and the world leadership but instead reflects the concept which Smith has toward it. In fact, Smith wishes evidently to say that the purpose of my accusations of bureaucratism and maneuvers is to serve as a battering-ram for my political differences with the present world leadership, as if I hid those differences or removed from them what they contain of a break with some Trotskyist ideas of yesterday -- or if Comrade Smith wishes to exploit the term -- of revision. But it will certainly not be from our revision that opportunism will issue. Since we are in disagreement with the present world leadership, Smith thinks -- mark this remember the kind of thinking -- we have to attack his organizational methods, inventing them if they do not exist in fact. I repeat that that is Smith's conception and not ours. "Beware!" was the title of the document to which Smith does not reply, beware of a World Congress arranged or even convoked without the proper previous discussion of all the problems posed by the tremendous events supervening in the turbulent years from the founding of the Congress of the Fourth International to today. Were we right or wrong in sounding the warning? When Comrade Smith was labeling me disloyal, the IEC had already adopted the resolution on the method of representation to the World Congress, the examination of which can be seen in the article, "The Fourth International in Danger." Let us only recall some facts. Seven countries which have been conceded the grace of "first importance," will have at their disposal in the Congress approximately 38 or 35% of the votes and will lack only nine delegates to assure themselves a majority. Second, of the minorities, merely in order to be heard in the Congress, it is demanded that they have 25% of the members of their section, which represents an absolute disdain for the ideas of the minorities, precisely when the richest experience of the past years since the foundation of the Fourth, illuminating many problems with new light, demands to accord the maximum attention, not only to the ideas of the minorities, but even to those of completely isolated individuals. What the IS and IEC have decided to do cannot be considered, no matter how you look at it, Comrade Smith, as anything but a bureaucratic attitude towards ideas. Third, the resolution prohibits the delegation of mandates, with the result that a good number of groups and sections will be deprived of vote, groups and sections which, with a notion of discipline and loyalty which is not in the manner of the revolutionary movement, the present world leadership asks that they submit, from the present, to the discipline of a Congress in which many of them will not be able to vote. Even if there were no more than that (and there is more, as can be seen in the document, "The Fourth International in Danger") the foregoing in "Beware!" would be entirely justified. The "artificial noise" which Smith attributes to me has basis of definite solidity.

Far from proposing to attack deliberately the organizational methods of a leadership with which we are in political disagreement, we vigorously desire not to have to reproach it for more than its

political ideas. If it had started a discussion, immediately after its constitution, on all those problems which, with greater or lesser verisimilitude could be suspected of deserving a reconsideration, taking at the same time entirely democratic means for the discussion and the celebration of the Congress, our political criticisms and our demands for the reconsideration of certain problems would be maintained integrally, but we would recognize that the leadership is untouchable from the point of view of the methods, which would be very sane as a principle of coexistence of different factions in the same organization. Our activity and our ideas tend to just this idea. Unfortunately, the present world leadership has not comported itself thus, which obliges us to transfer the criticism from the political level to the organizational level. Let us add that its behaviour is not explained as much by its opposition to some of our points of view -- such as the problem of the defense of Russia -- as by the policy pursued by some of our parties toward the imperialist war and the movements of national resistance. Thus it is that our demand for discussion of this problem in the first place and as a special point of the Congress, giving previously all the documents necessary for the International to judge, has met such a sordid reception in the world leadership. I believe it is necessary to say here in order that it begins to be clear: in the final instance, forced by the weight of facts and by the displacement of the base, the defensist heads, the IS as well as the American party, can come to liquidate the "unconditional defense of the USSR." That evolution would be much more probable in case of war, since if, for example, the SWP did not take during the past war a defeatist policy nor afterwards knew how to correct its errors, there is no reason to suppose that it should have a defeatist policy during a war between the United States and Russia. This being the case, surely many will suddenly begin to discover the transformation of quantity into quality. Above all, it is the opportunist errors which it does not wish to recognize, which dictates the organizational attitude of the IS, its manner of directing the discussion, which ignores totally the necessities of our movement and its calcified terminology.

I have full right to say this to you, Comrade Smith, because you and the IS have very precipitately directed all kinds of accusations of disloyalty at me, while you have as yet to direct even one severe glance at that policy which was defined as non-support for Imperialist War, transformation of this same war into a true war against Fascism, no obstruction to the effective prosecution of their war (that of the capitalists), etc. Isn't it more important to direct one's gaze and criticisms at politics of this kind?

With this, your paragraph on the functioning of the International as well as everything else you have written, is answered.

As for the quotations from Leon Trotsky, I reserve the right to return to it in my writings at a later date. However, I have this to say in advance if you find it to your interest to use it, I disagree with it and it appears to me to be entirely false today. And if the International should be guided by it, it would destroy Leon Trotsky's own work.

Mexico, D.F., August 1947.



DO WHAT I SAY AND NOT WHAT I DO

By

G. Munis and Benjamin Peret

Discipline! Such is the slogan with which the International leadership -- constituted by men who boast of being strong -- attempts to hide its ideological nakedness. Certainly, no one is more of a partisan of discipline than we are, but it must not serve simply to guarantee a comfortable intellectual sleep for those who invoke it day in and day out. Discipline for the application of decisions democratically arrived at after a broad and loyal discussion, yes; discipline without discussion or democracy, no.

We have accused the International leadership of invoking discipline in order to assure the success of its bureaucratic maneuvers, and we have already furnished proofs of these maneuvers (see "The International in Danger"). The crisis in the English party furnishes a different example of these maneuvers.

In a previous document the International leadership demanded from the comrades and groups asked to participate in the World Congress a pledge to accept its discipline in advance. This demand -- we repeat -- is anti-democratic and constitutes an extremely dangerous precedent, authorizing, moreover, an actual ideological dictatorship by the International leadership which will come out of the Congress, a dictatorship which the present leadership is contemplating since it already wishes to prohibit all discussion in the International following the conclusion of the Congress, but in what nook or cranny has there been a discussion? We don't know of any. That pledge will therefore permit the leadership to stifle all life in the International since each time that a section or individual comrade comes forth with a new idea or suggests a tactic not foreseen by the Congress, the leadership will be able to brandish the pledge previously taken at this Congress and invoke the discipline of the barracks and the grave.

Further, the International leadership -- and this time it is right -- is in favor of a policy of unification where our movement is divided into two or more groups which are not separated by principled differences. For several years a discussion has placed a minority of our English section, favorable to entry into the Labor Party, in opposition to the majority, which refuses to envisage this immediate perspective. Let us say immediately that we are in all cases opposed to entry into reformist "workers" parties of the type of the Labor Party or the French Socialist Party. This tactic dates from the epoch of the radicalization of reformist parties (1933-1935). To follow that tactic today is to give proof of ideological inertia, since previous conditions are absent. These parties are, by their own confession, no more than "loyal managers" of bankrupt capitalist businesses (Leon Blum dixit) and without them and the Stalinist parties they would be incapable of making the masses accept the unheard of sufferings that the Stalinists and

reformists succeed in imposing on them thanks to the marriage, which is strengthened every day, of their apparatus with that of the capitalist state. Tactically, then, we do not have a common political interest with the English minority since we advocate a policy of united front with left minorities within reformist parties as well as with left proletarian organizations opposed to Stalinists and reformists. We are equally in disagreement with the majority of the RCP which, during the war, imitated the opportunist policy of the SWP and has up to now been unable to disentangle itself from the conservative policy of the International leadership. But now the English minority threatens to break the discipline of the next convention of the RCP by splitting, through insisting upon the immediate application of the tactic of entry into the Labor Party. It demands, in the event that the majority of the party comes out against its tactic, the right of beginning work "under its own control." That is very definitely the breaking of discipline and splitting.

Beginning with the hypothesis of a healthy internal life in the RCP, what should the IS do to remain faithful to its policy of unification of the Trotskyist movement throughout the world and so as not to violate its own decisions relative to the acceptance of the discipline of the World Congress in advance? It obviously ought to say to the English minority: "You wish to enter into the Labor Party to form nuclei there for the creation of a left wing. Good. But you accepted the discipline of the last national convention; on our part we are enforcing the discipline of the World Congress accepted in advance. You must remain in the Party while submitting yourselves to the majority since your differences are on tactical questions." However, if the English minority spontaneously and not encouraged by the IS threatens to split, we think that the IS then ought to recommend to the convention of the English party to authorize the minority to go through its own experience of entry into the Labor Party under the control of the leadership of the RCP. Instead of that, what has the IS done? It first of all made contact with the English minority unbeknownst to the leadership of the party, that is, it encouraged the breaking of discipline by the minority. (Letters of the PC of the RCP to the IS dated June 23, 1947 and July 15, 1947.) Why? Comrade Gabriel clearly indicates it in his letter of July 6 addressed to the PC of the RCP: "...to establish concretely the experience of the line which you defend and that which the minority and the majority of the International defends." In other words, Comrade Gabriel in the name of the IS avows his agreement with the tactic defended by the minority. And this explains that. It is useless to say that a split exists only as a distant perspective; it is no less true that the IS encourages the minority to resist by approving its intentions and thereby drives toward a split. But Comrade Gabriel is prudent and wishes to save appearances. That is why he proposes a discussion between the majority, the minority, and the IS. What could be more normal in appearance? Although the IS does not dare to propose that this tripartite meeting come to a decision by voting, the result of which would be guaranteed in advance since



the IS controls two votes out of three, it is obvious that it would be in a position to inform the International (which would not know in advance that the IS encourages the English minority) thereby "orienting" it toward the IS. This is evident if it is considered that the resolution condemning the threat of split which was presented to the IS by Comrade Conrad in the name of the majority of the RCP was rejected. What can that be called other than a maneuver, for it is the same International leadership which demands a pledge of prior acceptance of the discipline of a World Congress being held after nine years filled with events of incalculable significance which refuses to impose it on a minority of a party that determines its policy by regular conventions. A question, comrades of the International leadership: is the minority of the RCP centrifugal or centripetal? Thanks for the answer.

Thus the International leadership employs discipline at the pleasure of the interests of its conservative policy menacing those who are opposed to its political line and permitting its faithful to violate it. We categorically reject such an interpretation of discipline. It is a reflection of the degeneration provoked in the working class movement by Stalinism and Reformism. We will never submit to it because we know how to react against that degeneration. That degeneration is summed up in what is called in Spanish la ley del embudo, the English equivalent of which is represented by the sentence preceding these lines.

To conclude: we repeat once more: we are categorically against the position of the English minority and opposed to the political line followed by the majority of the RCP, a line similar in its entirety to that of the International leadership, which aids the most conservative (centrist) tendencies of our movement. We consider that the International leadership has favored the split tendencies of the minority, violating its own decisions in regard to the World Congress, while it ought to have acted inversely. We think that if a genuine democracy reigns in the English party -- which we believe -- the living together of the two tendencies is possible, the minority applying its tactic of entry into the Labor Party under the control of the national leadership, democratically elected and including representatives of the minority. The International and we are correct in saying to the IS: You who demand prior acceptance of the discipline of a World Congress held after nine years without discussion or contact refuse to demand of a national minority that it submit to the decisions of the convention of its party. The proof is thereby given that your demanding discipline is only a means of covering politically conservative ends by organizational proceedings. It is against this that we intend to establish a catalyzing agent in the International.

Mexico, D.F.  
August 22, 1947.